The main issues in semantic change are examined. It is argued that the various formulations and quasi-formalizations in the literature are premature for the simple reason that semantic change is determined by links in the human mind/brain. Mental schmata subsume an array of affiliated conceptions that change in response to stimuli, as reflected in meaning differences from speaker to speaker and over time. In our attempts to classify and make sense of the universe, we place value judgments on objective labels. These subjective (e)valuations differ sometimes greatly from one speaker to another and as our conception of the referents evolves over time. Part of (e)valuation involves comparisons or utilization of a label from an item conceptualized as similar. Metaphors at least initially bear evaluative nuance. Metonymy involves transfer of labels by reanalysis mediated by associated contexts. Attempting to itemize all forms of metonymy is no more feasible than taxonomizing mental interconnections. Whatever structure there is to semantic change is not even constrained solely by the structure of links in the human mind/brain, because changes in the environment and interaction with various subcultures constitute independent variables that shape the outcome of semantic change.