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금융감독기구의 독립성과 책임성 확보
The Goal and Task of Banking Regulation and Supervision
김용재 ( Yong Jae Kim )
금융법연구 1권 2호 83-118(36pages)
UCI I410-ECN-0102-2012-320-001805685

Bank regulators and supervisors should have a substantial degree of independence both from the government and the industry in order to fulfill their mandate and contribute to the achievement and preservation of financial stability. In addition, considering the significant role of banking supervision, proper channels of accountability should be established to complement agency independence and make it work. Recently two factors have served to emphasize on the importance of regulatory and supervisory independence (RSI). First, in almost all of the systemic financial crises of the 1990s, either weak and ineffective regulations or regulatory forbearances, largely due to the political interferences in the supervisory process, have been referred as major factors contributing to the weakening of the banks, postponing recognition of the significance of the crisis, and delaying official and effective intervention. Secondly, the discussion of the most appropriate regulatory and supervisory structure, including the organizational structure of banking supervision inside or outside the central bank, has highlighted the importance of RSI. The growing tendency of unified financial sector supervision often involves removing the banking supervision function from the central bank, where it had previously enjoyed a relatively high degree of independence regarding its monetary policy functions. This was also the case in Korea after the IMF bailout of 1997. Korea prior to the 1997 crisis is a representative example of the effects that a lack of independence can have on banking supervision. Commercial banks were under the direct authority of the monetary board (the governing body of the Bank of Korea) and the Office of Banking Supervision. Specialized banks and nonbank financial institutions were under the direct authority of the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE). The MOFE`s supervision of nonbanks was generally recognized as so weak and created conditions for regulatory arbitrage and excessive risk-taking, especially among merchant banks, which was a contributing factor to the 1997 crisis. Furthermore, the supervisors had the authority to waive regulatory requirements, which led to widespread forbearance and which made enforcement nontransparent. In recognition of the weakness of supervision, Korea has reformed its supervisory system to provide it with more autonomy and to eliminate the regulatory and supervisory gaps. However, the reform has proven to be a failure because it does not give any RSI to a new financial supervisor, especially to the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS). This paper aims at searching for any alternatives to the current financial supervisory system which ensures RSI for the FSS. RSI is the goal and task of banking regulation and supervision, thus continuously attaining financial stability in Korea.

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