The Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) recently announced that it would amend the Commercial Banking Act of Korea in order to allow korean style conglomerates (so called chaebols) to get bank ownership in the near future. Under the current Act, chaebols has been limited to hold their maximum shareholding to 4% of total outstanding shares with voting rights. This kind of ownership regulation beforehand is anachronistic to the recent deregulation movement in the financial world. To make matters worse, chaebols are able to hold secretly majority shares of commercial banks so long as these holdings are inferior to qualified foreign shareholders provided that their holdings did not exceed those of foreigners. For that reason, some scholars have criticized that the anti-holding regulation against chaebols should be abolished immediately since it has no reasonable justification. However, the author believes that the current amendment is not adequate nor timely in considering the serious financial difficulties worldwide caused by the insolvency of Lehman Brothers``. In addition, people have an enormous doubt about chaebols`` real intention why they have pursued to get bank ownership in Korea. Last year, one whistle-blower who was one of the highest in-house lawyer and retired from the Samsung Group confessed that the owner of the Samsung Group had maintained lots of borrowed accounts to conceal dirty money at its financial subsidiaries. Due to this scandal, people are very afraid that if chaebols are allowed to own a bank they will surely use it either as a private funding source or as a illegal vehicle for a tax evasion and a money laundering and so forth. Thus, most korean people do not support this kind of reform at this time, and strongly believe that banking and commerce should be separated for the time being. Part II deals with the U.S. policy of separating banking and commerce. In the U.S., a highly publicized battle was triggered from mid-2005 through mid-2007 when Wal-Mart, the world`s largest retailer, applied for permission to establish Wal-Mart Bank, A new Utah-chartered industrial banks. In particular, three significant issues were raised including, ① whether commercial ownership of industrial banks is contrary to the U.S. policy of separating banking and commerce, ② whether commercial ownership of industrial banks creates serious risks for the U.S. financial system and the broader economy, ③ whether the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has adequate supervisory powers to control such risks, despite the FDIC`s lack of consolidated supervisory authority over the parent companies of industrial banks. Part III analyzes deeply the current amendment in Korea comparing the 2008 policy statement of the Federal Reserve Board in the U.S. This analysis shows clearly that the FSC made serious errors in reforming the Banking Act due to its excessive favoritism toward chaebols. That is, the FSC mis-translated the 2008 policy statement and distorted the truth itself. Based on these analyses, part IV is the conclusion of this paper.