Foundationalism is an idea found not only in metaphysics and epistemology but also in diverse areas such as ethics, social science, natural science, culture, and so on. I define foundationalism as the idea that there is some foundation which is the ultimate source of justification for our world, knowledge, rationality, culture, goodness and so on. In the theory of interpretation as well, to search for such a foundation of the meaning of a text is the main tradition. We have seen the modem root of foundationalism of interpretation in Schleiermacher. Before him, however, the philological and biblical hermeneutics tried to find the foundation which determined the meaning of a text, The foundationalism of interpretation is currently developed in two directions. One is Intentionalism, the other is Fomialism The idea that the author is the origin or the privileged arbiter of the meaning of a text has dominated interpretive theory since the notion of author came into being. According to this idea, the meaning of a text is to be identified with or found in the intention of an author, and the aim of interpretation is to find the intention of an author. Although the problem of how to decode the intention of an author is itself the subject of extensive critical debate this idea has had powerful influence on the theory of interpretation. In the current era, E. D. Hirsch is the representative of Intentionalism. By claiming that the intention of an author determined the meaning of a text, Hirsch tries to overcome the views which deny the existence of a normative principle for judging the validity of interpretation. Nan Stalnaker applies this theory to Edouard Manet``s Luncheon in the Studio. Intentionalism is criticized by several theories in the twentieth century. One of them is Formalism, and one of leading theorists of Formalism is Monroe Beardsley. Beardsley calls Hirsch``s thesis "the identity thesis," and defines it as claiming that what a literary work means is identical to what its author meant in composing it. Beardsley claims that this identity thesis can be conclusively refuted by three arguments. From these arguments, he concludes that in order to know the meaning of text we have to look into the text itself, neither into its origin(author) nor into its resuits(reader). It is in its language that the text happens. A text contains all the information necessary for its interpretation in the text on the page, and the aim of interpretation is to find what the sequence of words in the text itself means. Roger Fry applies Formalism to Cezanne``s Le Compotier. Despite this difference, both of Hirsch and Beardsley share common assumptions. First, both of them agree that there is a foundation which is the ultimate source of justification for the meaning of a text. Second, since the meaning of the text is already given and determined by the foundation, our interpretation is to passively find what the author intends or what the sequence of words means, not to actively construct or constitute it. Third, both of them try to set up the objectivity of interpretation, refuting scepticism and relativism. Finally, both of them agree that two incompatible interpretations cannot be both true, that at least one of them must be wrong. Therefore, despite the difference of their interpretive foundation, both of them agree that interpretation is to find one objectively true meaning of a text through a foundation. But these assumptions can be criticized as follows. First, the meaning of text is not straightly determined by some foundation, but circularly determined by several components. According to Gadamer, the meaning of text is determined in a whole relationship of interpreter, text, unity, and consensus. Second, since the interpreter plays an important role in a whole relationship, the meaning of text is not passively found, but actively constructed by interpreter. Third, there are plural aims with which interpreter can approach to the text. Interpretation can aim at the intention of an author or the linguistic structure, but this aim is only one of plurality of possible aims. Both Hirsch and Beardsley err in their privileging their specific interpretive aim as the only one right aim. Fourth, there can be plural true interpretations on the same text, and sometimes they can be incompatible with each other.