본 연구는 K-IFRS 시행에 따른 경영자와 감사인간의 의견불일치의 변화와 K-IFRS 시행 이후 변화된 경영자와 감사인간의 의견불일치가 감사의견에 미치는 영향에 대해 살펴보았다. 분석 결과, K-IFRS 시행 이후에 이전에 비해 경영자와 감사인간의 의견불일치 크기와 빈도가 유의하게 증가하였다는 것을 확인하였다. 따라서 K-IFRS에 따라 재무제표를 작성하고 공시하는 과정에서 감사인이 전문가로서의 역할을 적극적으로 수행하면서 경영자의 주장과 다른 의견을 제시한 결과로 볼 수 있다. 한편, K-IFRS 시행 이후에 증가된 경영자와 감사인간의 의견불일치가 감사의견을 변형하는데 유의적인 영향을 미친다는 결과는 나타나지 않았다. 추가적으로 연도별 고정효과를 통제하기 위하여 de-mean process를 적용하여 분석을 수행하였다. 또한 경영자와 감사인간의 의견불일치가 KOSDAQ 기업에 많기 때문에 KOSDAQ 기업만을 대상으로 분석을 수행하였다. 분석한 결과는 본 연구의 분석결과와 동일하였고, 본 연구의 결과를 강건하게 한다. 또한 경영자와 감사인간의 의견불일치 기업 중 비적정의견을 받은 기업에 비해 적정의견을 받은 기업의 DA가 더 높다는 것을 확인함으로써, 감사인이 경영자의 재량적인 이익조정을 감사의견의 변형에 중요하게 반영하지 않는다는 것을 확인하였다. 그리고 잠정이익과 실제 이익에 대한 이익 분포의 비대칭성을 측정하여 실제이익 분포가 잠정이익 분포에 비해 비대칭성이 완화된다는 것을 확인하였다. 마지막으로, K-IFRS 시행에 따른 경영자와 감사인간의 의견불일치와 감사의견의 재무적 요인을 분석하였고, 경영자와 감사인간의 의견불일치에 유의적인 영향을 주는 재무적 요인은 무형자산, 대여금, 단기차입금, 이연법인세부채, 장기사채이며, 감사의견의 변형에 유의적인 영향을 주는 재무적 요인은 단기차입금과 이연법인세부채로 확인되었다. 본 연구의 결과는 K-IFRS 시행 이후에 감사인이 경영자의 이익 상향조정 의도를 억제시키고, K-IFRS의 원활한 정착을 위한 조력자의 역할을 수행하고 있음을 보여준다. 그러나 경영자와 감사인간의 의견불일치가 있는 기업의 감사의견을 형성할 때 경영자의 재량적인 이익조정을 중요하게 반영하지 않음으로써, 규칙중심의 회계기준보다 원칙중심의 회계기준에서 경영자의 재량적인 이익조정이 증가할 가능성이 높다.

IFRS have been mandatorily adopted to Korean listed firms since 2011. The financial experts` decisions such as auditors affect the financial statements under IFRS more than under K-GAAP because IFRS are the principle-based accounting standards and K-GAAP are the rule-based accounting standards, so that manager and auditor disagreement is expected to increase after enforcing K-IFRS. This study investigates whether the difference of manager and auditor disagreement exists between the pre and the post enforcement of K-IFRS and manager and auditor disagreement affects audit opinion significantly after enforcing K-IFRS. I document that there is the significant difference of manager and auditor disagreement between the pre and the post enforcement of K-IFRS. Moreover, I find that both of the amount and the frequency of manager and auditor disagreement increase after enforcing K-IFRS. Therefore, auditors performed audit works aggressively and conflicted with managers` assertion frequently in process of reporting and disclosing the financial statements after enforcing K-IFRS. Besides, most of the disagreement firms are KOSDAQ firms which did not sufficiently prepare to adopt K-IFRS. So, it seems that auditors performed as assistants to settle K-IFRS in the unprepared firms such as KOSDAQ firms gradually. However, I document that the increase of the disagreement between manager and auditor after enforcing K-IFRS does not affect the modification of audit opinion significantly. Also, I find that the firms with the disagreement between manager and auditor disclosed the qualified audit opinion after enforcing K-IFRS less than before enforcing K-IFRS. Through the additional analysis using de-mean processing to exclude the fixed effect by year and using only KOSDAQ firms which have most of disagreement samples, the results from de-mean processing and KOSDAQ firms are similar to those of this study. Second, I document that DA of the unqualified audit opinion firms is higher than that of the qualified audit opinion firms out of the disagreement samples, which means that auditors do not materially consider the discretionary earnings` management as they modify audit opinion of firms with the disagreement between manager and auditor. Third, I analyse the earnings distribution to find whether the difference of the distribution asymmetry between the preliminary and the reported earnings exists, and I confirm that the distribution of the reported earnings are mitigated as compared with that of the preliminary earnings. Finally, I analyse which financial factors affect the disagreement between manager and auditor, and audit opinion after enforcing K-IFRS, and I confirm that intangible assets, loan receivables, short-term borrowings, deferred tax liabilities, and longterm debts affect the disagreement between manager and auditor, and short-term borrowings and deferred tax liabilities affect the modification of audit opinion. This study investigates the change of manager and auditor disagreement and audit opinion after enforcing K-IFRS and the results of this study provide some implications. First, auditors performed audit works aggressively after enforcing K-IFRS. They constrain managers` income increasing earnings management after enforcing K-IFRS and perform as assistants to settle K-IFRS in the unprepared firms such as KOSDAQ firms. Second, the discretionary earnings` management is expected to increase under the principle-based accounting standards as compared with the rule-based accounting standards because auditors do not materially consider the discretionary earnings` management as they modify audit opinion of firms which have the disagreement between manager and auditor. Even though this study provides various implications mentioned above, it has some limitations. First, it is possible that the results of this study are biased toward the characteristics of firms which disclose the preliminary financial reports in accordance with the regulation of ``timely disclosure``. Firms are required to disclose the preliminary financial reports when they face the material change in the current net income as compared to the prior net income. Second, it analyses with the samples of FY 2011 only when K-IFRS was mandatorily enforced. For the reason, it is necessary to carefully use or apply the results of this study and it is worthwhile to study with the additional samples in the future.