John Dewey`s view of nature has been dualized as anthropocentrism or ecocentrism; the former assessment is enacted predominantly by Bob P. Taylor, Eric Katz and C. A. Bowers while Hugh P. McDonald and Anthony Weston attempts to evidence the latter. Taylor and Katz criticizes that Deweyan naturalism regards non-human nature as a mere means to enable humans to realize their own desire or interests, and Bowers stigmatizes Dewey as a cultural sectionalist centered on Eurocentric mindset, marking that his naturalism roots in Charles Darwin`s evolutionism, per se. However, reversed voices co-exist with those negative assessments; remarking that Dewey named his philosophy as ``naturalistic metaphysics,`` McDonald claims that Dewey admits the intrinsic value of non-human nature by suggesting a theory of relational value while Weston advocates Deweyan environmental pragmatism and its logical efficiency as he vehemently contests the logic of non-anthropocentrism. Dewey`s holistic pragmatism itself cannot be dualistically conceptualized as anthropocentrism or ecocentrism since his experimentalism which is significantly distanced from a priori reasoning welcomes experiential, thus, logical organity. Above all, the concept of his scientific and social ``inquiry`` and its instrumentation invalidates any dualistic mapping of Dewey`s metaphysics and his methodology. The value of non-human nature is spacio-temporally formed depending on scientific inquiry and democratic decision-making in a particular community whether it is homocentric or ecocentric. Besides, anthropocentrism should be differentiated from the concept of anthropomorphism because any metaphysics including Deweyan pragmatism cannot possibly avoid anthropomorphism. (Chonnam National University)