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국제법 입장에서 본 한반도의 비핵화문제
De-Nuc1earization of the Korean Peninsular in International Law
황영채 ( Young Chai Hwang )
아세아여성법학 3권 245-272(28pages)
UCI I410-ECN-0102-2014-300-001751806

Since che beginoing of che age 1945, ic has been a Iife-or-death cask for all manlcinds co pcevenc proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Norms of non-pcoLferation of nuclear weapons has been accepted as a principle of internacional law since che [Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT)]. The NPT, signed in July 1968 and came ioco force in 1970, was direered ac prevencing rhe emergence of che 6ch nuclear-weapon pnwec in addicion to che existiog five staces(USA, USSR, UK, France and China). Thus, it has anempted co prevent che number of nuclear-weapon scates noc to halt cbe nucleac arms race by the nuclear-weapon powers. Despite of the unequal elemencs of the creacy obligacions, which was designed co place more emphasis on che horizoncal non-proliferation of nuclear-weapon-sraces than the vertical non-ptOuferation of nuclear weapons, NPT has now more than 160 parties. And it has concluded chat should coocinue in force indefinitely at the 5th Review Conference in L995. Currendy, both South Korea and Nnnh Korea are conrraCt members of the NPT. And both authorities have agreed to submit all cbeir peaceful nuclear activities co the IAEA safeguards. However recendy, North KOtea came under suspicion chat twO Duclear reactors, which were not reported co the IAEA, indicated cbe production of pluconium(pu-239). Naturally, the 1AEA and UN parries insisted of rhe permission of "special safeguards" on those suspected reactors according to rhe Resolution agreed in the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, concerning the diversion of nuclear materials to the armament from peaceful nuclear activities. Despite of repeating urge from the !AEA and UN parties. Nonh Korea refused to accept special safeguard from rhe IAEA, and even came to declare the withdrawal from the NPT and lAEA. North Korea took back its step ro undertake treaty commitment again, when it had been pressed by international public opinion. South Korea and Norrh Korea had signed an Agreement so called "Declaration of De-Nudearization of the Korean Peninsula" in 1992 through the souch-north-calks during JUSt five or six mQDths. This agreement came broken on che point of Norrh KOtea``s withdrawal (tom the NPT. Noun Korean governmem wanes only USA as a calks-panner. and gOt already some effores, namely "Geneva Agreemenc" in 12 AugUSt 1994. In the Agreement, Norch Korea agreed that. Nouh Korea would remain a contracting member of the NPT and allow implemelltation of irs safeguards agreement under the Treaty in return for construction of light-water reactor in North Korea by KEDO (Korea Energy Developmem Organizarion). North Korea also promised to open the south-north talks to discuss Uoinc Declaration on the Denudearizacion of the Korean Peninsula] co achieve peace and security within che Peninsula. In recum for the condicion, USA promised to provide political assurance againSt the threat or use of nuclear weapons ro North Korea. NPT is encouraging nuclear-weapon-free zones as the righc of scates to join into cegional arrangemencs for purpose of keeping their territories free of nuclear weapons. When both North and South Korean authorities re-open peace calks and cry co find the way to realize de-nuclearizacion wichin the Peninsula, above mentioned agteements and the NPT wiU be che basic Norm for each. And both parries have to undertake che ducies of following pwvisions; 1. Obligation noc to possess nuclear weapons: Boch parries should nor manufacture, acquite and conuol nuclear weapons, including nuclear re-processing reaCtor and plUtonium of which the possession by Norrh Korea is under suspicion. 2. Obligation of the safeguards: Both parties should accept the inspection to all the peaceful aCtivities. Particularly, botb parties should undergo the full-scope safeguards thtOugh whole fuel-cycle, according co the strengthened policy on nuclear safeguards since 1974. Specifically, "special safeguards" on arch Korea is tequired co trace the suspeCted plutOnium. North Korea had only promised to "cease" nuclear activities in suspected reactors. 3. Verification of Non-nuclearization: Both parties should verify their non-nudeatized state, in advance to agree the de-nudearizarion. However, either parties ate disagreeing to this point, when the Declaration of De-Nudearization of the Korean Peninsula was broken off from the disagreement of methodology of safeguards, Thus, the agreement on rhis point is critical to achieve mutual consensus for de-nuclearization. As mentioned above, there are still many obstacles to overcome in order to realize the de-nuclearization in the Korean peninsula. De-nuelealization of the Korean Peninsula will contribute the peace of northeastern Asia Stepping forward world peace, as well as bmh Soutb aod Norrh Korea.

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