There has been a big dispute with regard to the corporate controlpower between the CEO of KB Financial Holding Company (FHC) and the CEOof KB Kookmin Bank in 2014. Though the system of FHC was introducedabout 14 years ago, the governance of it was not settled yet in Korea. This KBdisputes served as a momentum of this article. This article examines the causesof CEO risk regarding the system of corporate governance of FHC and suggestssolutions to reduce the risk. First, Supervisory Authorities (SA) and FHCs need to change their rulesin order to define detailed positive qualification of CEO candidates, which wouldprevent inadequate candidate (such as those who has powerful politicalbackground but do not have experience in managing financial companies) frombeing a CEO of FHC or its subsidiary bank. Second, SA and FHCs need to establish clear-cut lines of authority andresponsibility among the CEOs of FHC and its subsidiaries. Unclear line ofpower is a cause of disputes. Third and most of all, the system of board of directors and audit committee need to be reviewed. Though Korea introduced those system inorder to enhance the supervisory function of board on the management ofexecutive officer, the system did not work as it was expected. Finally, SA needs to review the long-standing system of the separationof banking and commerce and to reduce excessive intervention on themanagement of financial companies.