합병비율 불공정이 사후적으로 확정되어도 현재 한국의 법현실에서 합병비율의 현저한 불공정이 아니라면(이것도 무효사유인지 의문이 제기됨) 합병무효 판결이 불가능하고, 형식적으로 합병비율 산정에 관여한 이사 등이 법령이 요구하는 합병비율 산정기준을 따르는 등 선관주의의무(특히 회사에 대한 선관주의의무)를 다하였다면 책임주체 없이 불공정한 합병비율로 불이익을 입은 주주의 상태가 고정되게 된다. 합병무효도 아니고 합병비율이 불공정하나 책임을 물을 대상이 없고, 불공정한 합병비율로 인한 주주의 불이익 상태가 영구화되는 것을 막기 위한 수단으로 독일 조직재편법이 규정하고 있는 합병결의취소의 소 제기권 배제와 금전보상청구권 및 주식보상청구권 등을 포함한 개정 논의, 오스트리아 주식법과 스위스 합병법의 보상청구권과 결부된 합병결의취소의 소 제한에 관한 입법례를 적극적으로 검토해 볼 가치가 있다. 특히, 합병비율이 불공정한 경우 추가적인 주식보상을 통해 불이익을 입은 주주를 보호하는 것은 정당한 합병비율이었다면 처음부터 가능했던 상태를 주주에게 회복시켜 준다는 점에서 주주의 이익을 가장 효과적으로 보호하는 대안으로 평가된다. 향후 현행법상 합병비율 불공정으로 야기되는 불편하고 불공정한 상태를 해소하기 위해 원용가능한 보상청구권의 기본적 내용에 대한 시론적 제안을 하였으며, 보상청구권에 관한 추가적인 연구를 기대해 본다.

Germany has two ex-post protection instruments for the shareholders who are disadvantaged because of unjustified merger ratio : the right of the shareholders of the transferring company to claim an additional cash payment, and the right to claim damages against members of the management board and the supervisory board. Of the two protection mechanism this article analyses the right of the shareholders of the transferring company to claim an additional cash payment. According to the German Transformation Act (Umwandlungsgesetz) §14(2) the shareholders of the transferring company can not bring a cancellation action against the merger resolution based on the fact that the ratio applicable to the exchange of shares has been specified at too low a value. The purpose of this paragraph is aimed to prevent from delaying the entry into force of the merger due to long lasting and cost intensive disputes over the assesment of the value of the merger parties. Instead of filing a cancellation action the concerned shareholder may claim additional cash compensation from the acquiring company [German Transformation Act §15(1)]. Upon a corresponding petition having been made, the court shall determine which additional payment is appropriate pursuant to the regulations of the German Act on Valuation Proceedings as Appraisal Proceedings (Spruchverfahrensgesetz). However, the shareholders of the acquiring company are entitled to file an action against the their merger resolution of the shareholder meeting. But it is legally not allowed for them to make a petition due to too an unfair merger ratio for additional cash compensation in the Valuation Proceedings. This different legislation which has no reasonable cause is hardly criticised under scholars and practitioners. It should be changed into the direction that the shareholders of the acquiring company claim additional cash compensation just like those of the transferring company in exchange for giving up to bring an cancellation action. It is also strongly recommended to introduce the compensation in form of stock by legislation. The compensation by means of stock is an essential and effective instrument to protect the integral interests of the shareholders who suffer the dilution of their control and voting rights on the acquiring company. It is time for legislation in Korea to recognize compensation claims (cash or stock compensation claims) for shareholders who are disadvantaged by the too unfair merger ratio. Considering the effective protection of shareholders and the difficulty of liquidation in the event of the merger nullification, it is better not to allow shareholders to bringing an action of merger invalidation, instead to grant the right to claim compensation for the disadvantage caused by the unfair merger ratio. In particular, protecting the disadvantaged shareholders through additional stock compensation is considered the most effective way to protect the interests of the shareholders in that it restores the shareholders in a state that was possible from the beginning if they had a legitimate merger ratio.