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1.

김종선 ( Jong Seon Kim )

북한의 핵개발 노력과 이를 저지하려는 국제사회의 대응 속에서, 북한은 내부적인 문제들로 인해서 비핵화 프로그램에 참여할 가능성이 존재한다. 이러한 비핵화 과정은 오랜 시간과 많은 투자가 필요하기 때문에, 어떠한 형태로든 우리나라가 책임을 지어야 할 부분들이 많을 것으로 예상된다. 그러나 이제까지의 연구들은 상대 적으로 추상적인 부분들에서 이루어져왔다. 이에, 본 연구는 비핵화의 실질적인 사례를 통해서 프로그램 수준에서 북한의 비핵화 전략을 고찰해보았다. 이를 위해서 본 연구는 구소련의 러시아, 우크라이나 비핵화 사례를 살펴보았다. 사례연구 결과, 북한이 비핵화의지를 갖게 하는 환경조성이 우선적으로 중요하며, 초기에는 핵물질 및 무기의 비핵화에 초점을 두고 실행되어야 함을 알 수 있었다. 이와 더불어, 북한의 비핵화 프로그램은 주로 핵관련 시설의 폐기와 군수부문의 민간전환을 통한 경제건설 프로그램들이 장기적인 관점에서 전략적으로 지원되어야 할 것으로 나타났다.
2.

이윤식 ( Youn Seek Lee ) , 고경민 ( Kyung Min Ko )

본 연구의 목적은 한반도 및 동북아의 평화와 안정을 위협하고, 국제비확산체제의 근간을 훼손하는 북핵문제의 새로운 해법을 모색하고자 하는데있다. 지난 20년간 한국 및 관련국들은 북핵문제 해결을 위한 비핵화 프로세스를 가동해 왔음에도 불구하고, 오히려 북한의 핵능력은 점점 더 고도화되고 있다. 심지어 북한은 최근 핵보유국을 공식화하고, 국제사회가 인정하는 핵보유국 지위 획득을 위한 전략적 행보를 보이고있다. 그런데 문제는 현 체제에선 북한의 핵개발을 중단시킬 마땅한 수단 및 대응책이 없다는 것이다. 또한 기본 방식의 반복으로는 절대 북한의 행동을 억제하고 저지할 수 없다는 것이 결론이다. 이에 본 연구는 북핵문제 해결을 위한 새로운 방안으로, ‘투트랙 전략’과 ‘포괄적동시병행 전략’을 제시하고, 이를 정책에 반영하기를 제안한다.
9.

황영채 ( Young Chai Hwang )

Since che beginoing of che age 1945, ic has been a Iife-or-death cask for all manlcinds co pcevenc proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Norms of non-pcoLferation of nuclear weapons has been accepted as a principle of internacional law since che [Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT)]. The NPT, signed in July 1968 and came ioco force in 1970, was direered ac prevencing rhe emergence of che 6ch nuclear-weapon pnwec in addicion to che existiog five staces(USA, USSR, UK, France and China). Thus, it has anempted co prevent che number of nuclear-weapon scates noc to halt cbe nucleac arms race by the nuclear-weapon powers. Despite of the unequal elemencs of the creacy obligacions, which was designed co place more emphasis on che horizoncal non-proliferation of nuclear-weapon-sraces than the vertical non-ptOuferation of nuclear weapons, NPT has now more than 160 parties. And it has concluded chat should coocinue in force indefinitely at the 5th Review Conference in L995. Currendy, both South Korea and Nnnh Korea are conrraCt members of the NPT. And both authorities have agreed to submit all cbeir peaceful nuclear activities co the IAEA safeguards. However recendy, North KOtea came under suspicion chat twO Duclear reactors, which were not reported co the IAEA, indicated cbe production of pluconium(pu-239). Naturally, the 1AEA and UN parries insisted of rhe permission of "special safeguards" on those suspected reactors according to rhe Resolution agreed in the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, concerning the diversion of nuclear materials to the armament from peaceful nuclear activities. Despite of repeating urge from the !AEA and UN parties. Nonh Korea refused to accept special safeguard from rhe IAEA, and even came to declare the withdrawal from the NPT and lAEA. North Korea took back its step ro undertake treaty commitment again, when it had been pressed by international public opinion. South Korea and Norrh Korea had signed an Agreement so called "Declaration of De-Nudearization of the Korean Peninsula" in 1992 through the souch-north-calks during JUSt five or six mQDths. This agreement came broken on che point of Norrh KOtea``s withdrawal (tom the NPT. Noun Korean governmem wanes only USA as a calks-panner. and gOt already some effores, namely "Geneva Agreemenc" in 12 AugUSt 1994. In the Agreement, Norch Korea agreed that. Nouh Korea would remain a contracting member of the NPT and allow implemelltation of irs safeguards agreement under the Treaty in return for construction of light-water reactor in North Korea by KEDO (Korea Energy Developmem Organizarion). North Korea also promised to open the south-north talks to discuss Uoinc Declaration on the Denudearizacion of the Korean Peninsula] co achieve peace and security within che Peninsula. In recum for the condicion, USA promised to provide political assurance againSt the threat or use of nuclear weapons ro North Korea. NPT is encouraging nuclear-weapon-free zones as the righc of scates to join into cegional arrangemencs for purpose of keeping their territories free of nuclear weapons. When both North and South Korean authorities re-open peace calks and cry co find the way to realize de-nuclearizacion wichin the Peninsula, above mentioned agteements and the NPT wiU be che basic Norm for each. And both parries have to undertake che ducies of following pwvisions; 1. Obligation noc to possess nuclear weapons: Boch parries should nor manufacture, acquite and conuol nuclear weapons, including nuclear re-processing reaCtor and plUtonium of which the possession by Norrh Korea is under suspicion. 2. Obligation of the safeguards: Both parties should accept the inspection to all the peaceful aCtivities. Particularly, botb parties should undergo the full-scope safeguards thtOugh whole fuel-cycle, according co the strengthened policy on nuclear safeguards since 1974. Specifically, "special safeguards" on arch Korea is tequired co trace the suspeCted plutOnium. North Korea had only promised to "cease" nuclear activities in suspected reactors. 3. Verification of Non-nuclearization: Both parties should verify their non-nudeatized state, in advance to agree the de-nudearizarion. However, either parties ate disagreeing to this point, when the Declaration of De-Nudearization of the Korean Peninsula was broken off from the disagreement of methodology of safeguards, Thus, the agreement on rhis point is critical to achieve mutual consensus for de-nuclearization. As mentioned above, there are still many obstacles to overcome in order to realize the de-nuclearization in the Korean peninsula. De-nuelealization of the Korean Peninsula will contribute the peace of northeastern Asia Stepping forward world peace, as well as bmh Soutb aod Norrh Korea.
10.

고종건

This article presents scenarios of North Korea’s Denuclearization and Korean Unification at North Korean sudden change. The North Korean sudden change will be a critical event on North Korea’s denuclearization and Korean Unification. The end state of North Korean sudden change will be variable by the seriousness of the crisis, the ways of intervention by stakeholders, and whether they can reach the agreement for the unification of the Korean Peninsula. The first scenario is North Korea will fix the crisis before neighboring countries``s intervention. If North Korea can``t deal with the crisis, neighboring countries will intervene to secure NK’s WMD. Intervention by China is the second scenario, and co-intervention by stakeholders is the third scenario. The first and second scenarios are negative to achieve the goals, North Korea’s Denuclearization and Korean Unification. The third scenario is relatively positive to achieve the goals.