This paper is an attempt to throw light on the role and status of scientific explanation within the system of the humanistic disciplines. The main arguments revolve around a critical examination of positivistic monism which sees in the nomological-deductive model of explanation (interpreted broadly so as to include the probabilistic) the sole legitimate mode of explanation in all systematic cognitive endeavors. Science is an intellectual activity that aims at knowledge of a given realm of phenomena. Such a knowledge, when systematized into a body of statements which explain the phenomena in question, constitutes a particular branch of science, whether it is a natural, social or humanistic one. Explanation is both the method of arriving at, as well as the systematic expression of such a knowledge. Explanation as the method is closely connected with the character and structure of the objects to be explained. If the phenomena are of essentially the same character and structure despite their apparent differences, the one single mode of explanantion would suffice for the construction of knowledge. If on the other hand they are fundamentally different character and structure, modes of explanation cannot but be diverse. The positivistic tradition in the philosophy of science is the prime example of methodological monism. Whether in natural, social or humanistic sciences, the aim of inquiry is the same, namely, explanation and prediction. This aim is to be achieved by subsuming individual phenomena under general laws. Thus the aim of all inquiry is to establish those nomological universal statements which can serve as the premisses in the deductive explanation and prediction. The methodological monism is buttressed by the phenomenalistic theory of meaning. According to this view, a system of scientific statements consists soley of observation sentences which record the experientially given and their logical constructions. All other statements, when not analytic, are devoid of literal significance. The statements of the social and humanistic sciences are meaningful in so fas as they can be translated into behavioristic or physicalistic terms. Those "objects" -such as values, transcendent objects such as gods and substances- which cannot be translated into those terms, are not objects of legitimate scientific inquiry. Bifurcation of fact and value, thematized for the first time by Max Weber, becomes absolute in logical positivism. Our intellectual tradition sees the world as consisting of three distinct realms: nature, man and society, and values. Natural, social and humanistic sciences deal with these realms respectively. Those disciplines which constitute the core of the humanistic sciences- philosophy, history and literature-have been characterized by the thematization of the most fundamental concerns of human life-life and death, pleasre and pain, duty and rights, fate and freedom. These primordial experiences of man are inextricably bound up with the questions of value. The values which constitute the basic concern of the humanistic sciences are those which serve as the basis for guiding and controlling the affairs of men both as individuals and groups. Does the discontinuity between fact and value made absolute by logical positivism entail a denial of the possibity of the humanistic disciplines as systematic cognitive endeavors? Is the discontinuity in the cognitive character of the natural sciences and the humanistic sciences acceptable in the form presented by the positivistic tradition? Our analysis of the logical structure of methodolgical monism reveals the fact that the system of explanations in the natural sciences presupposes an "explanation space" that consists of innumerable interests and value assumptions. The system contains, as an essential component a series of value statements, describing intentions, interests and presuppositions of the inquiry. They together serve to render a given system of knowledge relevant and perspicuous. Interdependence of fact and value thus established however leads to the difficult problems of relativism, the foremost among them being that relativism is incapable of distinguishing between "true" and "thinking it true". If no such distinction is possible, then an act of asserting and that of making noise become indistinguishable. A view of knowledge which cannot make this distinction forfeits all claim to serious consideration. An anlysis of realtivism in fact shows it to be self-refuting. All systems of knowledge, including those of the humanistic disciplines, must be based on some notion of objectivity, in so far as they can be understood and communicated. The fact that we do in fact speak of truth and falsity is an indication that we accept them as the preconditions for knowing and thinking about the world. Truth in this view is a regulative idea in the Kantian sense. All scientific statcment is a response to the question "why" a certain action, phenomenon or event has taken place. In fact, the character of response to the "why" question is not always uniform. It can take the form of a nomological-deductive explanation, a what-explanation, a purposive explanation, or a reason-giving explanation. We accept these explanations as appropriate in relation to a given explanation space. Our analysis has shown that any system of knowledge, in order to be relevant and perspicuous, must make use of different modes of explanation. Thus, if we accept objective truth as the aim of inquiry, then the humanistic disciplines must attempt to incorporate into their system of knowledge as much of the type of explanation paradigmatically used in the natural sciences. Our analysis also shows that the system of knowledge in the natural sciences must make use of those explanations which deal with values and intentions. "Relativity" of the natural sciences and "objectivity" of the humanistic disciplines are merely two different aspects of the cognitive situation of man.