The first pait of this papei is to sketch the main line of what has been called the phenomenologists`` aesthctic doctrines Tle purpose of such a sketch is not simply to introduce them in chronological order, but to examine then basic assumptions and appropriate phenomenological methods, i e , the disinteiested aesthetic appreciation (M. Geiger), the natuie of the aesthetic object as purely intentional object (R. Ingarden), and the imaginative artistic creation (J.P Sartre). These examinations are intended to show that, however phenomenology has been applied to art, each of them appears to be made as if art could be explained in terms, respectively, of appreciation, work, and creation, and, thus, to be structurally limited. The second part of this paper is, therefore, to suggest the corrective to such misleading and narrowly defined approaches to art I think it may be suggested not by bieaking art into its constituent elements of appreciation, work, and creation, but by considering it as a whole process. If then, art process becomes a communication of some sort and naturally implicates a social hebaviour. That is, ait has to be explained in terms of an institutional means of some sort 1-Icre arises n difficulty for the undeistanding of the conception of art as an institution. This is mainly due to various old assumptioms that art is primarily an individual, imaginative expression, that artist must seperate himself from social contiols in order to achieve the aristic autonomy But these assumptions involve the fundamental mistake to suppose that there is no continuity between the organized responses of individuals and the formal customs of the general society. In oider to examine the concept of the continuity I turned to the phenomenology of lvi. Merleau-Ponty who wrote "phenomenolgy of perception" already prepared in his first work, "the structure of behaviour", dedicated to the metaphysical problem of mind-body interaction. lie gives such a wide interpretation to the notion of behaviour as to include the sheer physical reaction, and traces the evolution of human cultural activity through a dialectic of orders-physical, vital, and human-in which varous kinds of from-syncretre, mutable, andsynrholie-aie organized in the behaviour ofa living organism. The superiority of human behaviour is, however, that Ihe subject may transcend its purely physical and vital nature in the construction of a symbolic situation. And applying his revised gestaltism to the facts of perception, Merleau-Ponty concludes that an essence is but a conventional or arbitrary name tacked on to an already experienced from of behaviour. The first and pre-rational experienced from he calls a primary expiession, which he claims may be analyzed and resynthesized in any fashion whatsoever by a human subject in secondary expressions. Therefore, the totality of primary expressions constitutes real human history and forms the subject matter of written history which is also likewise a secondary expression as science and philosophy. Here he links primary expressions with the individual ``parole``, that is, individual assimilation of the living ``langue``, by appealing to Saussure``s general theory of linguistics. Thus, for him primary and seccndary expressions which may remind us of Croce``s distinction of intuitions and concepts interact in such a way to enrich or impoverish the established language. If then, there is no individual activity aside from the insignificant release of tensions within individual organism, just as there are no completely determined examples of socially controlled iasponse. That is, all human activity is more or less individual and at the same time more or less social. The final part of this paper is to indicate that for Merleau-Ponty ait assumes its role as a primaiy expression in this system, and that it is of institutional nature. What follows is then to take into account some problems which issue from this argument. First, we have to analyze the institutional nature of art in such a way as to isolate the special function played by that institution. In a general way this purpose may ha stated as the development of novel meanings for Merleau-Ponty and then art must be expounded in the general theoiy of knowledge for him. This suggests that there is another kind of knowledge, though pre-rational, and that art is likewise a from of cognitive activity os science though diffrant from each other in their nature. I think it is really a philosophical point in question whether such an argument can ha supported. But it is significant that, if it will be accepted as having a valid ground, a bright prospect would be promised for the foundation of philosophy of art. In comparision with it, it is worth noting that even the minimum ground has been difficult to be arranged for philosophy of art in Anglo- American philosophy, and that this philosophy has advanced philosophy of art criticism instead, though there is an aesthetician like Virgil C, Aldiich who has tiied to woik out a philosophical ground for the foundation of philosophy of nit with dililculty. Thus, we con now say as follows ait is a watarshed, and is offered as a hattie field, between two camps of philosophy. Secondly, what I have found inteiesting is that the notion of nit as an institution is also analyzed by G. Dickie, an analytical philosopher who put the definition of ait in terms of the art world suggested by A. Danto. Indeed., there are incompatible differences in many respects between Merleau-ponty``s and 0. Dickie``s notion of it, but I think we can easily discern a difference in that, whereas the former tries to expound how art with its institutional nature comes into being, the lattei tries to aigue for the existence of the ait world by desciibing a considerable amount of infoimation about it. Ileie we can find a ceitain relation between both of them. For, if Dickie``s conception of the institutional nature of alt is based on the existence of the empirical ait world and thus a possible giound of it has to be affirmed in any way whatsoever, Merleau-Ponty``s explication of art as an institution would be a philosophical ground for, and a point of contact with, that existence of the art world. Thirdly, since the argument that art is an institution implies in itself that it is a communication as a kind of social activity, alt may not ot can not be isolated from the other institutions of society,i. a., religious, political, and economic. Thus we have to take into account the effects of art upon the society. That is, these effects is not external to the nature of art, but is already implicit in the notion of art as a social institution of the communication of the novel meanings. So, the philosophy of art can be consummated only when it is extended to relate itself to the social psychology of ait. I thik that this new approach is to be pursued for the solution of the dilemma of contemporary aesthetics.