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논문검색은 역시 페이퍼서치

인문논총검색

Seoul National University the Journal of Humanites


  • - 주제 : 인문과학분야 > 기타(인문과학)
  • - 성격 : 학술지
  • - 간기: 계간
  • - 국내 등재 : KCI 등재
  • - 해외 등재 : -
  • - ISSN : 1598-3021
  • - 간행물명 변경 사항 :
논문제목
수록 범위 : 69권 0호 (2013)

기획의 말 : 동서양 유덕자의 초상

연구원자료
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거룩한 철학자의 초상 -포르피리오스의 플로티누스의 생애 를 중심으로-

송유레 ( Eu Ree Song )
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How are we to live? Socrates understands this question as follows: How are we to live in order to live well? He takes it for granted that we all want to live well. His answer to the question is that we are to live virtuously. Thus, virtue (arete) is the key to the good life, namely happiness (eudaimonia). Socrates` approach of aspiring to human excellence is opposed to one that is concerned with minimal decency. Most of the ancient philosophers share Socrates` aspiration, but especially the Platonists cherish the extreme version of ethical idealism. They ambitiously define the goal of their philosophy as ‘assimilation to god’ and believe that it is virtue that leads to god. In order to become godlike or divine, we need to be virtuous. For the ancient Platonists, the ideal philosopher is a virtuous man (spoudaios) as well as a divine man (theios aner). What does such an ideal philosopher look like? What is his virtue? How are we to conceive of the god whom he is emulating? To approach these questions, I suggest looking at a portrait of the ideal philosopher presented in Porphyry`s Life of Plotinus (Vita Plotini), a biography of a Platonist hailed as a pagan saint in Late Antiquity. It is shown that the biographer reconstructs the hero`s life in virtue of his theory of a scale of virtues representing different levels in an upward movement of divinization of the human soul, namely: (1) political, (2) purificatory, (3) theoretical virtues. Thereby the hero emerges as a perfect philosopher possessing all virtues. In addition, I argue that the portrait of the holy and divine Plotinus reflects much of the biographer`s own ascetic ideal of philosopher propounded in De abstinentia. Furthermore, it is noted that Porphyry attributes to Plotinus a divine power which goes beyond the levels of virtues. In conclusion, the holy philosopher portrayed in the Life of Plotinus is an ascetic and wonder-worker like the Christian saints, but, unlike them, a sage (sophos) embodying perfect virtue. The ideal of life envisaged by ancient Platonists like Plotinus and Porphyry offers an alternative or a challenge to the view that one can do philosophy without engaging in virtue and holiness, as well as to the view that one can be virtuous and holy without philosophy.

『장자』에 나타난 민(民)의 덕(德)과 정치역량 -외편의 ?변무? 등 4편을 중심으로-

김경희 ( Kyung Hee Kim )
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In the philosophical tradition of East Asia, de (德) has generally been understood as a key concept of Confucian ethics only. However, Daoists had also developed their own ideas of de. In this article, I examine the unique idea of de, as it appears in the Primitivist chapters of Zhuangzi, and try to consider its political implications. Within Confucianism, de refers to the inner inclination and capacity to act morally. It has to attained through the process of self cultivation and learning. Confucius required it as a personal quality for politicians - a quality that is special and uncommon, and can only be attained by a small number of people. This implies that, within the political sphere, the qualified and unqualified must be distinguished, and that the people(民) - representing the majority of community members - are to be excluded from the political and public sphere so that they cannot be become political subjects. Against this Confucian thought, the Primitivist author of Zhuangzi defines de as the capacity to, and activity of, live spontaneously which people naturally have as part of their inborn nature(性). It is described as the capacity ‘to weave for their clothing, to till for their food’. In this sense, de is a capacity that is shared by everybody, and that which needs not to be developed but discovered. In Primitivist writings, there is a political idea that we must not overlook. It is the idea that people have the ability to discuss and debate with their own mouths. The mouths of the people not only have the function of eating to live, but also have the function of speaking, and only when the two capacities are unified, the people can be established as political subjects. The Primitivist author tries to overcome the elitism that Confucianism displays on the issue of the political subject and attempts to illustrate the clues that make it possible to think about the capacity of the people as political subjects. Through this examination we can approach the socio-political vision proper to Zhuangzi, thus going beyond the viewpoint that regards the book to read as a nonpolitical text.

스피노자의 유덕자, 자유인 -자유와 합리성의 계보학적 재구성-

박기순 ( Ki Soon Park )
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Cet article a pour objectif de mettre en lumiere l`homme libre, que Spinoza construit comme un modele de la nature humaine. Il caracterise cet homme par sa rationalite et sa liberte en suivant la tradition philosophique qui existait avant lui. Pourtant, le philosophe hollandais les reconceptualise sur les nouveaux fondements metaphysique et anthropologique. Nous avons entrepris de qualifier cet effort spinoziste de genealogique d`apres son usage nietzscheen. Nous pensons qu`il est justement en cela le precurseur de Nietzsche. Dans cette perspective, nous avons voulu montrer par quel procede Spinoza arrive a reconstruire l`homme vertueux comme un modele de la nature humaine. Et nous avons souligne, au cours de nos recherches, que l`homme vertueux pourrait etre mieux compris, chez Spinoza, par les concepts tels que ‘equilibre’, et ‘diversite’ etc.., et que la passivite, au contraire, par le concept d`exces. C`est en cela, nous semble-t-il, que Spinoza se separe de Nietzsche. Car il parait evident que le spinozisme secretement conduit par l`idee d`equi libre se differe de l`esprit nietzscheen qui decouvre le modele de creativite dans l`exces dionysiaque. Il nous reste a eclairer cette transformation contemporaine du concept de vertu.

황종희의 유덕자 -함께 만드는 사회 안에서 성장해가는 사람-

이혜경 ( Hye Gyung Yi )
서울대학교 인문학연구원|인문논총  69권 0호, 2013 pp. 115-156 ( 총 42 pages)
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This paper considers the thought of Huang Zongxi - which is based upon the intellectual tradition of the Yangming School and also adheres to the idea that li (理) never existed on its own but was always a part of existing qi (氣) - by focusing on the notion of ‘virtue’ and examining how it is regarded within his writings. As the material existence of human beings comes from qi, and as the world is comprised of the movement of qi, the two are interlinked and move together. The mind that is able to sense what is good is also qi, and it constantly moves within a state of excess and deficiency. As such, individuals, as imperfect beings, must come together within society to keep in check, and compensate for, their shortcomings and to develop their virtues. Therefore, the formation of a society and the establishment of institutions that can provide a positive environment in which virtue can develop becomes an important moral and political task. The way in which Huang Zongxi focused on the development of virtue and how he combined this development of virtue with politics provides new insights for the field of modern virtue ethics, as well as demonstrating a way forward for Confucianism in the modern period.

덕 윤리와 유덕한 행위자 모델

장동익 ( Dong Ik Chang )
서울대학교 인문학연구원|인문논총  69권 0호, 2013 pp. 159-188 ( 총 30 pages)
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Virtue ethics has solved the disadvantages which come from Utilitarianism and Kantian ethics and so is esteemed as a rival ethical theory to normative ethics. It is much criticized by Utilitarian and Kantian ethics. Those who adhere to virtue ethics should be able to answer to the criticisms presented by utilitarian and Kantian ethics. In this paper, I present an explanation on the relation of the virtuous agent to right action, because this explanation allows room to understand how one may be a virtuous person and what are the things that a virtuous person does, this being one of the criticisms thrown towards virtue ethics. I first broadly examine the priority of aretaic evaluation in character trait over normative evaluation in action, because the relation between the virtuous agent and right action can be explained by different views in the priority of aretaic evaluation. I also consider the technical manual model, role model, and developmental model and suggest that the developmental model is the most appropriate as a proper model of being a virtuous agent in virtue ethics. While having argument about a formula about right action in virtue ethics` and a condition “agent knows” on an act`s being done in Nicomachean Ethics.

후설의 현상학적 사회윤리학의 의의와 과제

이남인 ( Nam In Lee )
서울대학교 인문학연구원|인문논총  69권 0호, 2013 pp. 189-218 ( 총 30 pages)
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In the 1920`s, Husserl developed his phenomenological social ethics in his two manuscripts on “Gemeingeist” and his five articles on “the ethics of renewal”. It is the aim of this paper 1) to clarify the basic structure of Husserl`s phenomenological social ethics, 2) to highlight the significance of phenomenological social ethics, and 3) to delineate some important tasks that phenomenological social ethics has to solve in the future. Section I shows that there are various dimensions to phenomenological ethics such as empirical phenomenological ethics, regional phenomenological ethics, formal phenomenological ethics, and transcendental phenomenological ethics. Section 2 and Section 3 clarify, respectively, the general structure of phenomenological social ethics developed 1) in Husserl`s manuscripts on “Gemeingeist” and 2) in his five articles on “the ethics of renewal”. Section 4 shows the significance of phenomenological social ethics developed in the manuscripts on “Gemeingeist” and the five articles on “the ethics of renewal”, on the one hand, and the future tasks that this phenomenological social ethics has to solve, on the other hand.

작품의 도덕성과 도덕적 가치 -거트의 윤리주의 비판-

이해완 ( Hae Wan Lee )
서울대학교 인문학연구원|인문논총  69권 0호, 2013 pp. 219-255 ( 총 37 pages)
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Can a work of art be artistically good or bad by virtue of its moral features? I critically examine Ethicism, Berys Gaut`s version of moralism, which partly claims that artwork is aesthetically defective in so much as it is morally defective. I find this is not a coherent position to maintain as it would face difficulties in handling some intuitively unfavorable cases. However, what I find more interesting is what lies behind this incoherence which stems from unclarity concerning how to judge the moral value of an artwork. It is my belief that we are not very attentive about a possible distinction between the ‘morality of a work’ and the relevant sense of the ‘moral value of the work.’ It is legitimate to evaluate a work in terms of moral standards, for example whether a work as a whole endorses a morally problematic point of view. This determines the morality of the work. However, I argue that this so-called ‘point-of-view morality’ does not determine the moral value of the work. A work`s moral value has to do with its capacity to influence the audience in morally significant ways. In order to decide the moral value, we may have to consider the effectiveness of the moral influence and artistic choices for this goal and not merely whether it endorses a certain point of view. For example, the audience would be able to utilize the immorality of the work to reflect upon their own moral sensitivity and scope, as immoralists claim. We can also think of a moral piece of work (that has a point of view morally praiseworthy) which has no moral influence to the audience reasons being; since it is too naive, too pedantic, too predictable, etc. Therefore, utilizing consequentialist`s view on moral value, I suggest how to evaluate a work`s moral value as an artistic value, where moral and artistic evaluation is one and the same. I believe Ethicism too, in spirit, wanted to establish this but was not able to do so due to its implicit identification of a work`s ‘point-of-view morality’ with its moral value.
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